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SUMMARY
This study analyses the allocation of power in the Governing Council of the European Central
Bank (ECB) as it enlarges to accommodate new members of the economic and monetary union.
For this purpose, classical power indices that have their origin in solutions of cooperative games
are applied. First, an assessment is made of the effects of enlargement on the voting power of
different subgroups of the Governing Council that arise in the wake of a continuous accession
process. Second, a systematic comparison is carried out of the status quo rule (“one member, one
vote”) with respect to the voting power of the ECB Executive Board and the representatives of
European monetary policy, along with the potential for its re-nationalisation.
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1. Introduction
At the end of a quite secretive discussion process the ECB Governing Council finally published
its proposal for a reform of the ECB Council’s decision making process in early 2003. The Heads
of State of the EU member countries approved the proposal made by the ECB on the rotation
model on March 21, 2003, in Brussels. For some analysts this unanimous decision came rather as
a surprise in view of the heavy resistance to the proposal which was virulent until the middle of
March in countries like Finland and the Netherlands, whose parliaments felt they had been treated
at a disadvantage. However, political acceptance of the proposal is by no means certain as all the
15 national parliaments must still ratify the modification of the EU Treaty.
As is well-known, the ECB’s reform proposal consists of a “minimum representation model”
combining elements of rotation as applied by the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors and
elements of representation, i.e. the formation of country groups with group representatives
following the example set by the IMF, the World Bank or the Bundesbank Council after German
unification (see, e.g., ECB 2003). In this context it is important to note that enhancing efficiency
was not the main motivation for the introduction of the rotation principle in the Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC). Instead, the voting power of regional governors was restricted in
order to be able to run a common monetary policy for a common region instead of a monetary
policy driven by regional interests. Most remarkably, the delegation of decision-making
competences in the ECB to a small committee with only a few national representatives
(“delegation” and/or “centralization”) was not regarded as an option at all. It was consistently
argued by the former President of the ECB, Wim Duisenberg, but questioned by the European
jurisprudence, that the wording of Art. 5 of the Treaty of Nice, Art. 10.2 and Art. 10.6 (the so-
called “enabling clause”) of the ESCB Statute prohibited a delegation or centralization solution
and limited the scope of the Council reform to a mere change in the voting procedures.
Supporting this view would imply accepting that the “blueprint” of the Treaty of Nice was flawed
and that the present “lopsided construction” was due to the lack of political power to correct the
mistake.
By speeding up the process of passing the reform, the ECB Governing Council met two own
strategic targets at once. First, its own proposal could be completely discussed before the new
members participated in the decision. Second, the ECB itself took the initiative for a proposal and3
did not leave it, for instance, to the EU Commission. But how should the ECB proposal be
assessed?
o  Without any doubt, the coming expansion of the euro area requires a reform of the
highest decision-making body of the European Central Bank because without reform the
ECB Governing Council is going to comprehend more than 30 members. This will raise
efficiency problems in the body that is responsible for the stability of one of the most
important world currencies (“numbers problem”, see e.g. Berger 2002).
o  Unfortunately, according to a plethora of authors like, e.g., Bofinger (2003), Gros (2003)
and Meade (2003b) the ECB proposal seems to be even less preferable than the current
decision-making procedure in the ECB Governing Council which itself is by no means
optimally prepared for the euro-zone enlargement. The rotation model suggested by the
ECB violates the fundamental principle of “one member, one vote” that is intended to
ensure that ECB Governing Council members participate in the Council’s meetings
personally as well as independently and not as national stakeholders. The rotation model
cultivates thinking in national categories, reduces the responsibility of the rotating
members for monetary decisions and heightens intransparency. Furthermore, the
limitation of the total number of rights to vote to 21 is far too generous by international
standards and will cause additional inefficiencies in the decision-making process. In
addition, the rotation model is inconsistent and contains arbitrary elements, such as the
fact that the frequency of the voting rights’ rotation is not explained and that a very small
country like Luxembourg will have a similar number of voting rights to Poland.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the ECB reform proposal for the
decision making process in an enlarged euro zone, i.e. the minimum representation model. The
next parts of this contribution contain empirically assess the resulting shifts in power between the
euro area member states. For this purpose, section 3 introduces the power index concept and
explains how to apply it to the new rotation model. Section 4 presents some algorithm-based
results and compares them to the respective power indices prevailing in the status quo. Moreover,
this section assesses whether the new rotation model serves the important property of
representativeness. Section 5 concludes and discusses further directions for research.4
2.  Minimum representation: the ECB reform proposal
A (price) stability oriented European monetary policy represents a collective good for the euro
countries because a low and stable rate of inflation is the best precondition for investment,
growth and employment. By contrast, a monetary policy prone to inflation may bring
unemployment down in the short term but reduces medium and long-term growth and
employment. It is the central task of any monetary policy constitution to assure that a central
bank like the ECB is not tempted to jeopardize a reasonable stabilization policy due to short-run
demands by governments or well-organized lobbyists. In Europe, this constitution comprises,
firstly, the anchoring of the goal of price stability in the EU Treaty, secondly a concept of
monetary policy that allows a viable policy of price stability as well as the documentation and
verification of the ECB’s willingness to maintain stability, and thirdly the organization of the
monetary decision-making. Particularly the latter item is of central importance, because this is
where the framework for daily decisions is laid down.
The necessity of reforming the decision-making process in the ECB Governing Council is beyond
question (see, e.g., Berger 2002). Under the prevailing body of rules, an expanded euro area
would lead to a large ECB Governing Council which is hardly capable of acting. Including the
six members of the Executive Board, the Governing Council would consist of more than 30
members. Guided by national interests, the latter would as a rule tenaciously struggle to arrive at
day-to-day decisions. This absolute increase in the number of members of the ECB Council
would in the end lead to efficiency problems. Another dimension of the problem is that coalition
formation among smaller euro member countries could lead to interest rate decisions which are
not optimal for the euro area as a whole. The period of natural coalition between the governors of
the larger member countries and the Executive Board, which in the first four and a half years of
monetary union enabled consensus decisions, would be terminated.
Finally, the discrepancy between the economic and the political weight of the euro member
countries in the Council would even increase due to the fact that the new members tend to be (in
economic terms) smaller in size. A too strong representation of the acceding countries, which are
characterized by higher inflation due to the Samuelson-Balassa effect, might lead to additional
economic costs for the euro-zone. According to some critics, these costs would consist either of
higher inflation in the euro area (although the latter should not be rated to be very high, i.e. above
0.2 percentage points of total euro area inflation) or of higher nominal and real interest rates in5
the euro-zone than otherwise (if the ECB reacts to this inflationary bias). Of course, this
argument heavily depends on whether there really are differences in motivation between the old
member countries of the euro-zone and the newcomers. However, one should not be so confident
that the EMU core countries endanger the stability mandate of the ECB to a lesser extent than the
CEECs will do later on (see, for example, the erosion of the Stability and Growth Pact by
Germany itself). The central question raised in this contribution reads as follows: is the ECB’s
reform proposal able to handle and dissolve these future problems?
Based on the assumption of a future euro area with 27 member countries (the current twelve
members, plus the United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark, plus the ten Central and Eastern
European countries which joined the EU in 2004 and Bulgaria and Romania) the ECB’s
Governing Council would consist of 27 national central bank governors and 6 directors.
According to the ECB’s rotation model the voting rights would then in the end be divided as
follows (see Table 2).
o  The six directors would possess a permanent right to vote.
o  The representatives of the five biggest countries (Germany, France, Italy, the UK and
Spain according to the criteria 5/6 share of euro GDP at market prices and 1/6 share in the
aggregated balance sheet of the euro-zone Monetary Financial Institutions (MFIs) share
four votes, i.e. these national central bank governors have to suspend their voting right in
1/5 of the meetings.
o  Eight votes are assigned to the central bank governors of 14 middle-sized member
countries. Thus, the participants of this group are entitled to vote only in 57 per cent of all
decisions.
o  The remaining eight central bank governors only account for three voting rights which
implies that these representatives are suspended from 62.5 per cent of the voting dates.
o  Irrespective of their specific voting right all national central bank governors always
participate in the discussions on monetary policy of the ECB Governing Council.
o  The problem that countries will not join the euro area at the same date was solved by
forming two groups until the accession of the 22 member (see Table 1) when first three
groups are built.6
Table 1: ECB rotation model: voting shares and frequencies of governors (2 groups)
Number of governors in the Governing Council
16 17 18 19 20 21
Voting shares 5/5 5/5 5/5 4/5 4/5 4/5
Group 1
Frequency of voting 100% 100% 100% 80% 80% 80%
Voting shares 10/11 10/12 10/13 11/14 11/15 11/16
Group 2
Frequency of voting 91% 83% 77% 79% 73% 69%
Sum 15 15 15 15 15 15
Source: ECB (2003), p. 78. Voting shares are defined as the number of
  voting rights/number of governors.
Table 2: ECB rotation model: voting shares and frequencies of governors (3 groups)
Number of governors in the Governing Council
22 23 24 25 26 27
Voting shares 4/5 4/5 4/5 4/5 4/5 4/5
Group 1
Frequency of voting 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80%
Voting shares 8/11 8/12 8/12 8/13 8/13 8/14
Group 2
Frequency of voting 73% 67% 67% 62% 62% 57%
Voting shares 3/6 3/6 3/7 3/7 3/8 3/8
Group 3
Frequency of voting 50% 50% 43% 43% 38% 38%
S u m 1 5 1 51 51 51 51 5
Source: ECB (2003), p. 79.
The implication of the ECB proposal in terms of the distribution of the voting rights between the
Executive Board on the one hand and the big, medium-sized and small euro member countries on
the other hand can be best analyzed (though rarely enacted up to now) using the game-theoretical
concept of power indices which will be presented from a theoretical perspective in section 3 and
will be applied empirically to the ECB decision-making process in section 4. In this sense, this
paper reaches beyond the early more narrative-style discussions of the adjustment of voting
modalities in the ECB Governing Council (see, e.g., Belke (2003) and Gros (2003)).
3.  How to apply the power index concept
The classical power indices which have their origin in solutions of cooperative games are often
used to observe and to quantify the allocation of power in a voting system. The distribution of
power which is roughly defined as the influence of players on a voting outcome usually differs
from the purely formal distribution of voting rights as has been shown in different studies (Owen
1995, p. 460, Holler/ Kellermann 1978 and Leech 2001a and 2001b).7
In this context, simple games are used to study the distribution of power in different voting
situations. These types of games are usually defined as a conflict in which the only objective is
winning and the only rule is an algorithm to decide which coalitions are winning. Weighted
voting games which are frequently used in voting schemes represent an important subclass of
these simple games. Two power indices, the Shapley-Shubik index
1 and the Banzhaf index
2 have
recently received the most attention in both the theoretical literature and the application to
political structures. Hence, we will apply both indices to study the allocation of power in the
Governing Council of the ECB in section 4. However, both indices and the way how to apply
them to the problem of assessing the voting power resulting from the rotation model will be
explained briefly in the following.
The Shapley-Shubik index  i φ  of the player i can be written as:
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where  C  is the number of the members of the coalition C, n the general number of players,
() C v the return of coalition C and  {} () i C v −  the payoff of the coalition C after the exit of player i.
Hence, the expression  () { } () [] i C v C v − −  defines the appreciation of the value of coalition C by
the player i. To obtain the Shapley-Shubik value of player i, the marginal contributions of player i
to all possible coalitions are summed up and weighted with the probability that the player i is the
last player who enters the coalition of the strength C .
In the calculation of the Banzhaf index the order in which a player accedes to a coalition is not
taken into account. Here the assumption of a simultaneous game is made and the number of
coalitions for which a player is crucial for winning is of central importance without considering if
he is the last to enter the coalition. This requires knowing the number of swings for every player
I, where a swing for player i is defined as a pair of coalitions  {} () i C C − ,  such that C is winning
and  {} i C −  is losing.
According to the Banzhaf concept, all coalitions are of equal probability. The players are
indifferent with respect to their choice of the coalition partners. Hence, the calculation of the
                                                
1 See Shapley (1997, p. 69-79).
2 See Banzhaf (1965, pp. 317ff.).8
Banzhaf index results in dividing the number of swings that player i has, by the numbers of
coalitions including player i.
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The concept of power indices has been frequently used to study the distribution of a-priori voting
power in different national and international voting systems. Dreyer/ Schotter (1980) and Leech
(2001a) published a study of power distribution in the IMF, Owen (1995, p. 460) analyzed the
security council of United Nations. Also the voting power of European Institutions has been the
subject in many studies. Bilbao et al. (2002), Sutter (2001) and Widgrén (1994) estimated the
power of member states in the Council of the EU, while the European Parliament was subject to a
power index application in Lane/ Maeland (2000). However, the distribution of power in the ECB
Council has been the subject of only a few studies, probably mainly due to the triviality of the
analysis of the “one member - one vote”-rule. Actually, the reform of this decision body
following the proposition of the ECB results in a change of the equal distribution of the votes.
Hence, the consideration of power distribution has become an important source of further insight
into the impacts of the recent reform of voting rights within the ECB Council.
Throughout the paper we will present the results of calculations based on both of the classical
power indices with the aim of checking for robustness of our results. However, we will base our
conclusions mainly on the results derived from the Shapley index, closely following the approach
of Widgrén (1994) in this respect. He has argued that the Shapley power index is more applicable
to voting bodies in which there is considerable communication among the voters and coalition
formation is active. This condition is surely met by the ECB Governing Council, due to e.g. the
informal meetings in the eve of the official sessions and the collegial definition of the voting
body.
3
In the following calculations, the decision making in the ECB Governing Council will thus be
assumed to be a weighted voting game. Each of the NCB Governors as well as the Governing
Board will be considered as one player. Furthermore, the following three assumptions are crucial.
                                                
3 On the contrary, it might be argued that the application of the Banzhaf index is more appropriate because of its
interpretation as an I-power index. An I-power index concerns voting behavior motivated by “policy-seeking”, while
a P-power index (e. g. the Shapley index) presupposes “office-seeking” behavior. See Fahrholz/ Mohl (2004, p. 6).
We give the importance of the considerable communication a higher weight, but at the same time still also refer to
the Banzhaf index which in almost all cases supports the results given by the Shapley index.9
First, it is assumed that all present members of the Governing Council cooperate over several
meetings. After the reform of the ECB Council according to the rotation model, the members of
the Council will not be allowed to vote at every session. Nevertheless, all of them will still be
present in each session. Hence, it seems plausible that the members will form coalitions which
persist during several meetings. In decision-making, it is not decisive if a vote is formally taken.
Of much greater importance is the possibility to use a vote on an average of several meetings.
This leads to an active formation of inter-temporal coalitions, when decision-making is prepared.
For this reason, the decision-making within the ECB Governing Council is considered as an inter-
temporally cooperative game in our approach.
The second assumption refers to the preferences and the voting behavior of the players. The NCB
Governors are regarded as representatives of their countries, thus voting with a national bias. This
assumption refers to the classical analysis by Meade (2003a, 2003b, p. 131 and 2003c, p. 2) who
has shown that a national bias in decision making of the ECB Council cannot be excluded.
4 As
long as the members of the Council are regarded as representatives of their countries because of
their heritage, an incentive strengthened by the new rotation model, the suspicion persists that
national aspects play an important role.
Finally, the third assumption defines the role of the Executive Board. In the following
calculations the Board will be considered as one player with six votes. The reason for this
assumption is that we focus on the allocation of power between the national representatives. As
the Executive Board is frequently assumed to represent the interests of the whole euro area, this
unanimity assumption appears to be highly plausible. However, there is no a priori restriction in
coalition forming between the National Central Bank Presidents.
The frequency of voting will be interpreted as the inter-temporal weight. It enters the calculations
as the voting weight of a player. Furthermore a simple majority rule has been assumed for the
calculations of the inter-temporal voting power, closely following the approach by Gruener
(1998, p. 4). The numerous calculations have been enacted based on an algorithm originally
developed by Bräuninger and König (2001), namely the Indices of Power IOP 2.0 program. The
figures presented in the following section are constructed in a coherent fashion: the x-axis
                                                
4 The assumption of a national biased voting behavior of National Central Bank Presidents has also been applied in
Bindseil (2001) und de Grauwe (2003, pp. 21ff.).10
displays the number of euro area member countries while the y-axis shows the relative voting
right and/or the respective power index of the respective player.
4. Results
4.1.  Relative voting share and power in the reformed ECB-Council
The relative voting weights usually allow a first view of the allocation of power in the ECB
Council. However, these numbers also form the basis for the calculation of the more elaborated
power indices. The numerical derivation of the voting shares and the resulting power indices can
serve as the main ingredient of a detailed description of the characteristics of each of both voting
rules to be compared in this paper, i.e. the “one person - one vote” rule and the new rotation
model. As a first step, the shifts of voting shares during the accession in a reformed ECB Council
is investigated. As a second step, the results of the calculation of voting power for this case are
discussed. In section 4.2., the results are compared to those derived for the status quo “one person
- one vote” rule. This comparison will finally allow a comparative judgment about the usefulness
and applicability of the new rotation model.
Under the rotation model, the relative voting weights do not change proportionally with each
enlargement of the euro area. The relative voting weight of the Executive Board is stabilized at
6/21 and the voting weights of the National Central Bank Presidents depend on the group to
which the considered member of the ECB Council can be counted, as can be seen in Figure 1.
While the relative voting weight of a National Central Bank Governor who is a member of the
fist group falls only once as the Union is enlarged to 19 members, the relative weight of the
members of the other groups changes almost with every accession. As a consequence of the euro
area enlargement, the relative voting weights of all groups as a trend fall, but for the members of
group 2 a sudden rise in voting weight can be observed, i.e. when the 19th and the 22nd member
accesses. Figure 1 also clearly reveals the discrepancy between the relative voting weights of
members of different groups. The graph of group 1 is always located above the graphs for the
other groups. Only once the curves of group 1 and 2 get closer to each other, whereas the relative
voting share of group 3 is always visibly smaller.11

















Which consequences does this allocation of voting rights have on the distribution of power
among the different members of the Governing Council? One important characteristic feature of
this reform proposition is the division of the Presidents of National Central Banks in two or three
groups with different frequencies of voting. The other important implication of the rotation model
is the stabilization of the voting share of the Executive Board. The allocation of power that results
in the wake of this reform under the assumption that the Council members cooperate over several
meetings is summarized in Figure 2.








16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
rel. voting share (Rotation) Executive Board
Shapley-index (Rotation) Executive Board
 Banzhaf-index (Rotation) Executive Board12
As shown in Figure 2, the power index of the Executive Board is much less stable in time as
could been expected after examination of the relative voting shares. After accession of the 17th
member country a sudden reduction of both power indices can be observed. The accession of the
17th country leads to an opposite reaction of power associated to the Executive Board: i.e. it
rises. During the following accession both indices decrease. This trend is reversed after the
accession of the 22nd member. During the forthcoming euro area enlargement rounds, the
Banzhaf index is rising whereas the Shapley index persists to be relatively stable during the
enlargement process. Why do these changes occur? In the first case, the power of the Executive
Board decreases because the size of the Council rises without a reduction of voting shares of
group one members. But the accession of the 19th member country (second case) leads to a cut in
the voting share in group one from 1 to  5 4 . The influence of the executive Board thus rises
because the members of the first group cannot be decisive for coalitions as frequently as before.
But the voting share of group one never shrinks below this mark of  5 4 . Hence, the power of the
Executive Boards drops until it is stabilized (in terms of the Shapley index) by the introduction of
group three (after the 22nd accession), due to a reduction of the voting shares in group two.
Before we will discuss the results of the calculation for each group, Table 3 displays the relation
between the power indices of the Executive Board and of each of the NCB Governor groups 1 to
3. It becomes obvious that the power of the Executive Boards exceeds the power of the National
Central Bank Presidents by a factor between 8 (in relation to group one) and 24 (in relation to
group three).
5
Table 3: The relative power of the Executive Board under the rotation model
Member countries of the euro area: 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
Shapley-Index Governing Board/
Shapley-Index Group 1 11.2 7.9 9.6 12.7 9.0 11.7 11.2 11.1 11.9 12.2 11.6 12.0
Shapley-Index Governing Board/
Shapley-Index Group 2 11.2 12.5 11.6 12.7 13.9 12.2 12.7 13.8 13.9 15.2 15.6 16.1
Shapley-Index Governing Board/
Shapley-Index Group 3 19.2 19.5 21.4 19.9 23.6 24.3
Source: Own calculations.
The development of the Shapley index of group one dependent on the euro area enlargement
seems to be nearly opposite to that of the Executive Board, as can be seen also in Figure 3. The
                                                
5 If the Banzhaf index is considered instead, the differences are even larger. In this case, the Executive Board
disposes of 14 to 70 times more power.13
Shapley index rises suddenly as the 17th member accedes. Hence, it can be assumed that the
members of the first group win the power lost by the Executive Board at this stage of
enlargement. As could have been expected, the power of the representative member of group one
decreases sharply after the 19th accession, because here the voting rights are cut for the first time
during the enlargement process.
Figure 3: Power and voting shares of a member of group one under the rotation model
      Source: Own calculations.
However, it proves to be more difficult to explain the surprising rise of the Shapley index after
the accession of the 20th euro area member. At this step of enlargement, power even exceeds the
relative voting weight. As the votes of the Executive Board and of the considered group do not
change at this point, the shift in the distribution of power can only be explained through the
decrease of the voting weights of the members of group two. This shift in the allocation of voting
rights changes the number of possibilities to be decisive in voting situations for group one
members and raises their power in this specific scenario. After the next accession, the power of
group one returns to the initial level again. The division of the NCB Governors into three
different groups does not affect the power of group one to a larger extent, it rests on a relatively
stable level.
The development of the Banzhaf index experiences significant breaks at similar stages of the euro
area enlargement process as the Shapley index (Figure 3). But the calculated Banzhaf values are







16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
relative voting share (rotation) member of group 1
Shapley-index (rotation) member of group  1
Banzhaf-index (rotation) member of group 114
Only after the 21st accession both curves seem to depart from each other. While the Shapley
value stays stable, the Banzhaf index decreases from now on with each following accession.
Figure 4: Power and voting shares of a member of group two under rotation model
Source: Own calculations.
When discussing the allocation of power to group two (Figure 4), changes observed until the
22nd accession can be explained in a similar way. The only surprising change is the sudden rise
in power after the accession of the 18th country. Despite the decreasing voting share, the power
as indicated by both indices rose. Hence, this stage of enlargement can be interpreted as a
favorable constellation of voting shares which abets group two. This reminds us of paradoxes like
“the paradox of redistribution” or “the paradox of size” typically discussed in the literature of
power indices.
6 After the accession of the 22nd country, the members of the second group lose
power continuously, their Shapley index decreases from 0.042 for a euro area comprising 20
member states to a realization of 0.032 in the case of 27 members.
                                                






16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
relative voting share (rotation) member of group 2
Shapley-index (rotation) member of group 2
Banzhaf-index (rotation) member of group 215
Figure 5: Power and voting shares of a member of group three under the rotation model.
Source: Own calculations.
Also for group three a negatively shaped curve can be observed (Figure 5). It is noteworthy that
this group three emerges from the accession of the 22nd country. The members of this group
dispose about a lower share of the voting rights than members of other groups, and the power
assigned to them is even lower than the voting share. During the enlargement process, their
Shapley index decreases from 0.02 to 0.015 at the final scenario of the accession process. The
power index of a representative member of group two exceeds the power of his counterpart in
group three two times in the final stage of a euro area consisting of 27 members.
Have the observed voting shares thus been good indicators of the distribution of power within the
reformed ECB Governing Council? The first hypothesis was that the power of the Executive
Board is stabilized by the reform. Our numerical application of the power index concept has
shown that the position of this “sub-Council” is not only stabilized but also possibly
strengthened. (This will also be approved by the comparison to the power indices resulting under
the status quo rule.) The Shapley index of the Executive Board amounts under all scenarios to
approximately 0.4. This means that after the reform of the ECB decision-making process, 40
percent of the voting power devolves upon the Governing Board.
7 Our second hypothesis
concerning the discrepancy between the power values of members of different groups can be
confirmed clearly. The five in economic terms biggest countries in the euro area have between 19
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relative voting share (rotation) member of group 3
Shapley-index (rotation)  member of group 3
Banzhaf-index (rotation) member of group 316
disposes of between 30 and 40 percent of the power, while group three with six to eight members
disposes about 11 to 13 percent of the available voting power. But the consideration of the
allocation of power has also revealed a new and unexpected property of the rotation model.
Especially in the sequential enlargement scenarios before the constitution of three groups,
surprising shifts of the power between the groups have been observed.
4.2.  Comparison to the status quo – “One person – one vote”
In the previous section, the voting shares and power indices for all members of the Governing
Council have been presented under the assumption of the rotation model being already in place.
However, the following comparison to the status quo (“one person – one vote”) will be helpful in
order to assess which changes are generated by the projected reform. For this purpose, the voting
shares and power indices in the non-reformed Governing Council are reported briefly first. To
check for robustness of our results, both the Shapley as well as the Banzhaf indices will be
indicated in some figures.
8 Nevertheless, our discussion will preponderantly refer to the Shapley
index.
For the not reformed Governing Council, under the “one member - one vote” rule, each of the
NCB Governors has one vote. Hence, their relative voting weight consequently amounts to 1/N,
with N as the number of all members of the Governing Council. As discussed before, the
Executive Board is regarded as one player; consequently the voting weight of this specific player
is 6/N. If a continuous enlargement of the Government Board is assumed, N increases and the
relative voting shares of every player fall. Figure 6 shows the power indices for the Executive
Board and additionally its relative voting weight. It becomes obvious that all displayed curves
reveal negative slopes. But both indices show a higher power index of the Executive Board than
could have been expected after the examination of the allocation of relative voting weights.
9 The
voting power that is attributed to the Executive Board by the Shapley index exceeds the relative
voting rights less than the respective power expressed by the Banzhaf index. The first index is
between 20 and 30 percent higher than the voting share, and the Banzhaf index between 45 and
60. In both cases, the distance to the relative voting weights is reduced by each accession.
                                                                                                                                                             
7 The numbers refer to the calculated Shapley values.
8 The exact results are summarized in Table III (Annex).
9 The Shapley index is normally closer to the voting rights as the Banzhaf index, as discussed in Sutter (2001, p.
341).17
Figure 6: Power of the Executive Board under the “one member – one vote” rule
Source: Own calculations.
But which impacts does this allocation of voting rights have on the distribution of power among
the NCB Governors? The presentation of the voting power and voting weights of the National
Central Bank Presidents in Figure 7 is very similar to Figure 6 at first glance but a closer
inspection immediately reveals that the curves have a different order. The NCB Governors have a
smaller influence on the voting result than expected if relative voting weights are examined.
Contrary to the results for the Executive Board, the Shapley indices now exceed the Banzhaf
values.
10 However, this result does not come as a surprise because a number of empirical
applications confirms that the voting power of the “largest” player often tends to be higher than
his voting share. The opposite is true for the “smallest” player, as discussed in Widgrén (1994, p.
1154). Here the Executive Board with 6 votes is the “largest player” and his power is several
times higher that the corresponding power values of an individual NCB Governor. Under the
status quo rule, the voting weights of the Executive Board are always six times higher than the
voting share of a single NCB Governor, while the difference between the respective power
indices is even more considerable.
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Figure 7: Power of National Central Bank Presidents under the “one member – one vote” rule
Source: Own calculations.
Figure 8 to 11 present a comparison of power indices resulting for each considered group of the
ECB Council. In Figure 8, the realizations of the power indices of the Executive Board under the
rotation model are compared to those under the status quo ante. It is clearly visible that the
rotation model not only stabilizes the power of this group. The Executive Board even gains
power after the reform proposed by the ECB; its Shapley-index is nearly doubled on the longer
term.
Figure 8: Power of the Executive Board (status quo and rotation)
Source: Own calculations.
But not only the Executive Board benefits from the adaptation of the rotation model; but also the
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accession phases as compared to their power in a non-reformed Council (Figure 9). Hence, there
are also groups who lose their possibility to influence the voting outcome. In this case, the losers
of the reform are groups two and three, as demonstrated in Figure 10 and Figure 11. Thus, the
NCB Governors of group two have to give up less power than the members of the third group.
While the second group’s members lose 10 to 20 percent of their initial power, the power indices
of the NCB Governors from the economically less important member states take values which are
between 38 and 45 percent lower than under the “one member - one vote” rule.
Figure 9: Power of a representative member of group one (status quo and rotation)
Source: Own calculations.
Figure 8, Figure 9, Figure 10 and Figure 11 also show very clearly that in the reformed Council
the enlargement of the Monetary Union leads to unexpected shifts in power of groups, as already
discussed in the previous section. Here it is visible that this development can not be observed in
the case of a non-reformed Council. According to the preceding analysis, the rotation model can
not be considered as a robust voting rule, as the accession of new euro area members can lead to
unexpected and also probably not intended shifts in the allocation of power. One important
implication for monetary policy making is that these unexpected changes make it difficult for the
public to form correct inflation expectations as long as the accession process is not completed.
The prediction of the actual possibilities for majority formation changes in a way which cannot
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Figure 10: Power of a representative member of group two (status quo and rotation)
Source: Own calculations.
Seen on the whole, thus, both positive and negative properties of the rotation model have been
identified in the wake of our systematic comparison with the status quo. The strengthening of the
Executive Board can be considered as a benefit. Its influence on the voting outcome is much
more important now within the reformed Governing Council. Hence, the representatives of the
European perspective which does not have a national bias have a stronger standing in the
reformed Council when compared to status quo.
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However, the lacking robustness must be seen as a disadvantage of the rotation model. Given the
new voting shares, it is impossible to predict how the relations of power will really change. This
voting system cannot be judged transparent, because intuition does not enable one to come to
similar conclusions as through the relatively complex calculation of power indices. Moreover, the
fact that after reforming the Council the members of group three are the only members which
considerably loses voting power confirms the suspicion that the present Governing Council
wanted to protect its voting influence at the expenses of the accession countries.
4.3.  An assessment of the “representativeness” principle
In designing the precise features of the rotation system, the Governing Council was guided by
some fundamental principles like “one member - one vote”, “ad personam participation”,
“representativeness”, “automaticity” and “transparency”.
11 In the following, we only focus on the
important principle of ‘representativeness’. Its justification by the ECB runs as follows.
The introduction of a rotation of voting rights could lead to situations in which the group of
governors with a voting right are from Member States which, taken together, might be perceived
as not being sufficiently representative of the euro area economy as a whole. The new voting
system, therefore, should be designed in a manner which would safeguard against such outcomes.
In order to achieve representativeness, governors might not be able to exercise the voting right
with the same frequency, with governors from the “larger” Member States having the right to
vote more frequently than those from “smaller” Member States. At the same time, any reference
to the country from which a governor comes should be made exclusively for the purpose of
determining the frequency with which each governor exercises the voting right. Although the
introduction of considerations of representativeness marks a departure from the existing
provisions for voting in the Governing Council, this is solely motivated by the need to
accommodate the impact of enlargement on the ECB’s decision-making. For all governors
exercising the voting right at any point in time, the “one member, one vote” principle should
apply. Consequently, this differentiation should not affect actual substantive decision-making but
should only be relevant in the process of determining who votes when.
In this section, one important aspect of this guiding principle of ‘representativeness’ itself will be
examined. According to this definition, an ECB Council voting system meets this criterion if it22
minimizes the discrepancy between the voting share and the respective economic weight of each
of the member countries. As a modification of this definition, the discrepancy between the voting
power and the economic weight and its development in the wake of the euro zone enlargement
process will be examined here. More concretely, it will be analyzed whether this difference is
diminished through the implicit abandonment of the “one member - one vote” principle and its
substitution by the rotation model.
For this purpose, two figures shall be compared. The first number expresses the relative voting
power of a single National Central Bank Governor for each accession phase as presented in
Amend (2003). The relative power will be calculated as the voting power of a National Central
Bank Governor divided by the power of all National Central Bank Governors, both expressed
through the Shapley value.
12 As the second number, the GDP ratio of the respective country in
the euro area GDP has been chosen as an approximation of the relative economic weight.
13 In
Figure 12, both figures are compared for each country in the case of a hypothetical euro area
consisting of 27 member countries. The order of the countries is chosen to correspond with the
ranking that results from the indicators proposed by the ECB. A first inspection allows the non-
rejection of the hypothesis that the introduction of the rotation model (grey bars) leads to an
improvement of the representativeness because in the status quo (white bars) the difference
between the economic weights and the political weights is larger. Nevertheless, the differences
between the power and GBP ratios are still large after the reform, especially so for the members
of group 1.
                                                                                                                                                             
11 See ECB (2003), pp. 75 ff., see also Bofinger (2003), p. 3, and Gros (2003).
12 See also Table II (Annex). With this definition, we closely follow Berger (2002), p. 12, and Gros (2003b), p. 125.
13 Table I (Annex) summarizes the GDP data for EU member and candidate countries.23
Figure 12: The guiding principle of ‘representativeness’ – power- and GDP-shares for the euro area-27
 Source: Own calculations. The black bars denote the respective GDP-share.
Considering the sum of squared deviations gives access to a more exact way to compare the
degrees of representativeness under the status quo and under the rotation model.
14 The sum
results from the differences between the GDP-weight and the relative power as measured for each
member country. Table 4 shows the sums of squared deviations in four different scenarios of
possible accession phases.
                                                
14 See Gros (2003b), p. 125.
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
G erm any




The  Ne t herl ands










C zech  Re pu bl i c
Hungary
Ru ma n i a
Sl ovac  Re pu bl i c
Sl oveni a






Share of the sum of Shapley-values
under the rotation model (white)
Share of the sum of Shapley-values
under status quo rule (grey)24
Table 4: Differences between the GDP-weight and the







Euro area 17 0.12 0.09
Euro area 22 0.12 0.10
Euro area 24 0.12 0.10
Euro area 27 0.09 0.07
  Source: Own calculations.
In each scenario, this sum proves to be smaller under the rotation model than under the status
quo. The sum of squares under the status quo in case of an euro area consisting of 27 countries is
0.09. As already supposed after the examination of Figure 12, this sum is smaller under the
rotation model with 0.07. Consequently, we feel justified to conclude that the rotation model
leads to an improvement compared to the status quo concerning the criterion of
representativeness. Nevertheless, even after the reform large differences between the shares in
power and in GDP can be found. This result is comparable to the results discussed in the
literature (see, e.g. Bofinger 2003 and Gros 2003) where only a slight improvement concerning
this criterion is ascertained.
5.  Conclusions and potential for further research
Our analysis of the inter-temporal power indices in the context of the Governing Council of the
ECB has revealed and highlighted some interesting aspects of both the reformed and non-
reformed voting system. One negative feature of the voting reform is given by the sharp shifts of
the allocation of power during the early euro area accession phases. This shift could have
negative effects on the transparency of the ECB decision making and may result in a bias of
inflation expectations. The second property of the Rotation model which comes at a cost consists
of the fact that the reform leads to a voting system where especially the acceding countries lose
influence on the voting result if compared to their voting power under the status quo. This might
lead to a re-nationalization of monetary policy in the euro area. However, one benefit associated
with the reform is the higher degree of “representativeness” after the reform. But this effect is
numerically very small and should thus not be overvalued. A further more important result is that
the voting power of the Executive Board has been considerably strengthened through the reform.
Under the quite realistic presumption that the Executive Board represents the interests of the euro25
area, this property tends to come as a benefit. In this case, the rotation model might have a
stabilizing effect on inflation expectations which alleviates the negative impact of sudden shifts
of the power allocation. Moreover, European instead of national aggregates could be more easily
accepted by the public as an anchor for the forming of inflation expectations.
However, this is not the first study of the new rotation model based on power indices. We are
aware of one other study in the field, namely the recent study by Fahrholz/ Mohl (2004). Despite
the methodology which is common to both papers, Fahrholz/ Mohl (2004) and ourselves arrive at
different conclusions. In the first mentioned study, the power of the Executive Board diminishes
as a result of the introduction of the rotation model whereas in our study the opposite appears to
be the case. The assumptions underlying each of the two approaches might be one explanation for
this difference. These assumptions build the core basis for the calculations of power indices and,
hence, are decisive for the results. In our paper, each National Central Bank Governor is assumed
to be a separate player and to follow a national perspective while the Executive Board is modeled
as one player due to the assumed common orientation towards European aggregates. In contrast,
the analysis by Fahrholz/ Mohl (2004) does not only model the Executive Board but also each of
the groups of National Central Bank Presidents which emerge after the reform as one player.
However, in our view, there are at least some significant counter-arguments against the view that
the National Central Bank Presidents will vote in a common sense fashion only due to the fact of
being part of one group (see, e.g., Belke 2003 and Meade 2003a, 2003b and 2003c). For instance,
for two large countries which clearly belong to group one under the scenario of a euro area-27,
namely Germany and the UK (with its cycle connected more with the US cycle than with the euro
area one), the business cycle pattern might not be exactly synchronous. Further potential caveats
with respect to the assumption of homogeneity among group members are the following.
First, the rotation procedure violates the central principle of “one person, one vote” as the latter
will only apply for those national central bank governors who are allowed to vote. The principle
is put into question in two ways. First, the countries are weighted and, second, the rotation takes
place with different frequency for each group. Thus, the reform proposal does not meet the ratio
of an integrative monetary policy. The renunciation of this tenet at best foments national
thinking. In other words, it re-nationalises European monetary policy.
Second, the principle of a personal and independent participation in the Governing Council, the
so-called ‘ad personam participation’, is impeded by the rotation model. Safeguarding this26
principle which was eminently successful in case of the “German Landeszentralbanken” was the
main motivation and legitimation of the principle “one person, one vote”. In this bloated
reformed Council, each governor will experience that it is mainly his national provenience what
will play a role in the monetary decision making and not his personality as a monetary policy
expert. This experience will most probably induce him to decide more from a national
perspective. This incentive will finally challenge the independence of the decision making
process in day-to-day executions within the ECB. Hence, a rational monetary policy according to
the stability goal becomes vastly complicated. Nevertheless, the different approaches taken by the
two studies offer a very fruitful field for further research.
It is conceivable to extend the approach taken in this paper also by certain aspects of the decision-
making in the Governing Council. First aspect, one could additionally take into account the
modalities of decision making. For instance, it is well-known that both the tradition to decide in a
consensual fashion and the „agenda setting power“ of the Executive Board are main ingredients
of the meetings of the ECB Council. Von Hagen (2003, p. 108) has taken these aspects into
account in his analysis of the Governing Council before the reform. He essentially applies the
median voter model to investigate which impact the traditional terms of decision-making have on
the results of the monetary policy. New insights could be gained if the rotation model would be
analyzed according to his lines.
As a third possibility of extending our analysis, monetary policy preferences of National Central
Bank Presidents could be included. By this, it would be possible to use information about
possible coalitions between Governing Council members who represent similar interests. The
probability models used in the papers which model the Governing Council could be modified in
accordance to information about the probabilities of the formation of certain coalitions. This
could be achieved by the definition of subsystems within which coalitions are entered with a
higher probability. This approach was first used in Owen (1977) and has been applied to the
Council of the EU in Widgrén (1994, p. 1154ff.). In a similar fashion, this approach could be
used to register the subsystems inside the Governing Council. Hereby, the Executive Board could
be defined as one subsystem. Analogously, those groups of National Central Bank Presidents
whose home countries traditionally have similar business cycles, could be modeled as
subsystems.27
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Annex
Table I: GDP of EU member and candidate countries




























Source: Eurostat (2003a and 2003b).
Table II: Representative National Central Bank Presidents’ shares of the sum of Shapley values
of all National Central Bank Presidents
 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
Gruppe 1 0.063 0.079 0.0638 0.0526 0.0678 0.0489 0.0552 0.0554 0.0522 0.0506 0.0536 0.0517
Gruppe 2 0.063 0.05 0.0524 0.0526 0.0441 0.0472 0.0483 0.0445 0.0447 0.0408 0.0401 0.0384
Gruppe 2 0.0321 0.0315 0.029 0.031 0.0264 0.0255
Source: Own calculations.30
Table III: Derivation of voting weights and power indices (rotation and status quo)
  16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
Rel. Voting share (Status
Quo) Executive Board
0.2727 0.2609 0.2500 0.2400 0.2308 0.2593 0.2143 0.2069 0.2000 0.1935 0.1875 0.1818
Shapley-index (Status
Quo) Executive Board
0.3529 0.3333 0.3158 0.3000 0.2857 0.2727 0.2609 0.2500 0.2400 0.2308 0.2222 0.2143
Banzhaf-index (Status
Quo) Executive Board




0.2857 0.2857 0.2857 0.2857 0.2857 0.2857 0.2857 0.2857 0.2857 0.2857 0.2857 0.2857
Shapley-index (Rotation)
Executive Board
0.4118 0.3858 0.3788 0.4000 0.3794 0.3647 0.3810 0.3800 0.3832 0.3820 0.3842 0.3826
Banzhaf index (Rotation)
Executive Board
0.5807 0.5232 0.5328 0.6013 0.5513 0.5447 0.5834 0.5939 0.6138 0.6291 0.6376 0.6472
Shapley index (Status
Quo) Nat. Central Bank
President
0.0404 0.0392 0.0380 0.0368 0.0357 0.0346 0.0336 0.0326 0.0317 0.0308 0.0299 0.0291
Banzhaf index (Status
Quo) Nat. CB-Pr.
0.0347 0.0335 0.0336 0.0325 0.0323 0.0313 0.0309 0.0300 0.0295 0.0287 0.0282 0.0274
Rel. voting share (Status
Quo) Nat. Central Bank
Presidents
0.0455 0.0435 0.0417 0.0400 0.0385 0.0370 0.0357 0.0345 0.0333 0.0323 0.0313 0.0303
Frequency of voting
group 1
5/5 5/5 5/5 4/5 4/5 4/5 4/5 4/5 4/5 4/5 4/5 4/5
Rel. voting share
(Rotation) group 1
0.0476 0.0476 0.0476 0.0381 0.0381 0.0381 0.0381 0.0381 0.0381 0.0381 0.0381 0.0381
Shapley index (Rotation)
group 1
0.0368 0.0487 0.0396 0.0316 0.0421 0.0310 0.0342 0.0344 0.0322 0.0312 0.0330 0.0319
Banzhaf-index
(Rotation) group 1
0.0262 0.0363 0.0285 0.0210 0.0293 0.0220 0.0228 0.0220 0.0196 0.0184 0.0188 0.0176
Frequency of voting gr.
2
10/11 10/12 10/13 11/14 11/15 11/16 8/11 8/12 8/12 8/13 8/13 8/14
Rel. voting share
(Rotation) group 2
0.0433 0.0397 0.0366 0.0374 0.0349 0.0327 0.0346 0.0317 0.0317 0.0293 0.0293 0.0272
Shapley index (Rotation)
group 2
0.0368 0.0309 0.0325 0.0316 0.0273 0.0300 0.0299 0.0276 0.0275 0.0252 0.0247 0.0237
Banzhaf index (Rotation)
group 2
0.0262 0.0246 0.0250 0.0210 0.0201 0.0216 0.0201 0.0181 0.0171 0.0152 0.0146 0.0136
Frequency of voting
group 3        
3/6 3/6 3/7 3/7 3/8 3/8
Rel. voting share
(Rotation) group 3
0.0238 0.0238 0.0204 0.0204 0.0179 0.0179
Shapley index (Rotation)
group 3
0.0199 0.0195 0.0179 0.0192 0.0163 0.0157
Banzhaf index (Rotation)
group 3
0.0136 0.0132 0.0118 0.0116 0.0098 0.0093
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